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Abstract 
Modern fisheries management must balance between return (economic value) and risk (harvest uncertainty and 
stock collapse). Management tools should target multiple simultaneous management objectives. These include 
output, number of seasons, total stock value and its uncertain fluctuations. I provide a stylized fishery model for 
simulating the outcomes of these competing management objectives under various regulatory and market 
environments. Results show that these objectives need not be mutually exclusive. They can be traded off gradually, 
quantitatively and transparently. The trade-offs involve profit and output versus job provision, employment 
security, stock conservation and less-risky harvesting. The pursuit of higher return must balance against the risk of 
stock collapse and harvest fluctuations. 
Keywords: marine reserve, fisheries management, simulations, trade-off. 
1. Fisheries Management Objectives 
Traditional fisheries management typically concerns the health of the fish stock, in particular, its size. For example, 
the Ecological Quality Objective (EcoQO) for the North Sea demersal fish community (Greenstreet et al., 2011) is 
the state-of-the-art development in this regard. It identifies size-based metrics as the most effective indicators of 
the state of the ecological community. Such metrics are also sensitive to environmental influence. The large fish 
indicator (LFI) is one such indicator that is sensitive to fishing-induced change. This complex relationship 
underscores the need for operational theoretical size-resolved multispecies fish community models to support 
management towards broader ecosystem objectives. 
At the moment, quantitative fish stock assessment techniques are far in advance of successful fisheries 
management applications. For example, techniques such as stock synthesis (SS) (Methot Jr. & Wetzel, 2013) adopt 
a statistical age-structured population modeling framework. It is highly scalable from data-weak situations where 
it operates as an age-structured production model, to complex situations where it can flexibly incorporate multiple 
data sources and biological/environmental processes. Despite the advances in these techniques, there have been 
relatively few successful applications in management practice. Hilborn (2007) holds a more optimistic view. 
Besides using marine-protected areas as the central tool of a new approach to rebuilding the marine ecosystems of 
the world, he argues that much can also be learned from examples of successfully managed fisheries: “These 
lessons are stopping the competitive race to fish by appropriate incentives for fishing fleets and good governance. 
The major tool of resetting incentives is granting various forms of dedicated access, including community-based 
fishing rights, allocation to cooperatives, and individual fishing quotas. Many of the failed fisheries of the world 
occur in jurisdictions where central governments are not functional, and local control of fisheries is an essential 
part of the solution.” (Hilborn, 2007, p. 296) The essential elements of these successfully managed fisheries are 
economic sustainability and the cooperative nature of the fishery industries. For example, BenDor et al. (2009) 
argue that this is particularly important in rural coastal areas where the fishing industry is often a dominant 
employer. They analyze the interactions between economic and ecological dynamic systems using a multi-agent 
dynamic model of fishery management. Multiple agents (fishers) harvest multiple fish species and adapt the 
amount and allocation of their effort to their value functions. These are given as net profits of the fish harvest sold 
for a market price. Their model suggests that competitive fisher behaviors lead to a decline of all fish stocks, as 
well as their profits. On the other hand, cooperative fisheries that jointly set sustainable limits for total harvest and 
effort can stabilize the fish stocks and profits at significantly higher levels. These then lead to a continuous 
accumulation of capital for all fishers. 
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I argue that, for modern fisheries managers, their first-and-foremost objectives must be to ensure that (1) the stock 
is sustainably harvested in a biological sense; (2) the stock is optimally harvested in an economic sense; and (3) all 
stakeholders are to be treated equally and fairly. For (1) and (2), the necessary hurdles must include a sustainable 
stock size, the total derivable economic value from the stock, and the periodic harvest output, effort and profit. For 
(3), the hurdles are less well-defined. However, it is reasonable to demand that they include the chances or 
probability of achieving the total derivable economic value; the number of harvest seasons required; and the 
variability of this random total derivable economic value. All of them affect to a large extent the livelihood of the 
parties employed by or involved in the fishery: fishermen, managers, scientists and coastal communities. 
Achieving these objectives often have the added bonus of ameliorating the economic consequences of a stock 
assessment error. 
The economic value of the stock supports the fishermen, the crew, the community, the managers and the science. 
The variability or uncertainty of economic return affects those employed by the fishery. Workers have to be laid off 
in a low season, only to be hired back in a high season. Variability affects the stability of livelihood. Furthermore, 
the notion of maintaining a certain stock size is popular with various legislation (Lauck et al., 1998, p. S76). Thus, 
finding the probability that this could be achieved is important. In economics, we might similarly wish to 
maximize the probability of achieving certain levels of fishery economic value and the number of seasons required 
to achieve them. This is because they affect the long-term planning of the investment and construction of amenities 
and facilities in the community. 
There are other non-economic but stock-related objectives. A complete list of these has been compiled by 
Novaczek (1995), Hockey and Branch (1997, p. 377) and Lauck et al. (1998, p. S77). 
This paper attempts to target some common fisheries management objectives: 
(1) achieving sustained and optimal levels of periodic harvest effort, output and profit; 
(2) maximizing the total expected fish stock value; the probability of achieving this or certain pre-specified levels 
of total stock value; and the sustainable stock size; 
(3) minimizing the fluctuations in the total expected stock value; and the number of harvest periods to achieve the 
maximum total expected stock value. 
I lay out the rest of the article as follows. The next section explains the model that runs simulations on the above 
management objectives. Section 3 then conducts a series of simulation experiments over these competing 
management objectives. I will highlight the inherent conflict and trade-off among these objectives. Section 4 
concludes with policy implications. 
2. The Simulation Model 
My simulations are based on an erstwhile model (Li, 2000). There are two assumptions: 
(1) The fishery is cooperative, profit-maximizing, license-restricted, poaching-free, maintains a biologically 
sustained stock, and is mutually agreed to a legally binding division of harvest profits through a successfully 
negotiated internal transfer payment system (Munro 1996); and 
(2) Harvest costs and demand for the harvest output are governed by deterministic market conditions and there 
exists no uncertainty regarding stock size, harvestability, and market demand. The unit harvest effort cost and the 
perfectly competitive harvest output price are both constant. 
Finally, the model also assumes a stable production function. The optimal harvest solution for the fleet is obtained 
by maximizing profit over harvest effort, subject to the harvest production equation and a stock sustainability 
requirement that links output to effort. 
Next, a certain percentage of total harvestable area is designated as marine reserve or no-take zone where all 
commercial harvest activities are banned. Suppose the marine reserve is strictly monitored and enforced and that 
the stock distribution over the total harvestable area is perfectly homogeneous. A perfectly homogeneous stock 
distribution assumption implies that the percentage of biomass inside the reserve and the percentage of biomass in 
the harvestable area are to be maintained at all times. Thus the biomass density (kg/m3) throughout the reserve and 
harvestable area is constant. Therefore, when the harvestable area is being exploited, there will be a net migration 
of individuals (biomass) out of the reserve into the harvestable area. Also, the percentage of the reserve stock 
foraging outside the reserve area is the same as that of non-reserve stock foraging inside the reserve area and 
exchange between the two over time is consistent. Consequently, harvest will be a function of non-reserve stock 
and the intensity of fishing effort only. 
Suppose that a fish stock is never going to collapse, the total value that can be derived from the fishery is the sum 
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of all sustained future periodic harvest profits discounted to the present. When the future prospect of a stock 
collapse poses a relevant threat, the assumption of a long time frame is no longer valid. Moreover, the fishery value 
that can be derived from harvest profits will also depend on when the collapse is likely to occur, and the timing of 
the collapse should also involve the interaction of effort and population dynamics. 
Once the stock experiences an unexpected collapse, it can never recover to an economically viable level for 
sustainable harvest. The model assumes that a marine reserve can mitigate such a collapse. The mathematics 
shows that the probability of stock collapse decreases with the proportion of the total harvestable area designated 
as a marine reserve. 
My simulation model, based on Li (2000), is a multi-period, marine-reserve-adjusted, stochastic-stock-size 
Schaefer model. It examines the relationship between the risk of stock collapse and the return of fishery economic 
value by using optimum harvesting and a marine reserve as the twin tools of management control. Next, I run 
simulations on this model using a stylized fishery. My objective is to show that the reserve size and harvest effort 
can target some common management objectives, in addition to maximizing fishery economic value. 
The main equations of the model are summarized in Appendix A (Li, 2000). My simulations are conducted by 
treating the model as an application package with the input parameters, control variables and output values detailed 
in the following Table 1. 
 
Table 1. Input parameters, control variables and output values for the simulation model 
Input parameters:   
Parameter name: Symbol: Unit: 
1. intrinsic growth rate r % 
2. per kg fish price p AUD$/mmt 
3. stock carrying capacity k mmt (million metric tons) 
4. harvesting cost c AUD$/worker boat hour 
5. catchability coefficient q mmt per worker boat hour per unit 
biomass 
6. discount rate  ρ % 
7. stock collapse rate λ probability 
Control variables:   
Variable name: Symbol: Unit: 
1. reserve feasibility (s<1-c/pqk) 1-c/pqk % 
2. reserve size s % 
3. optimal reserve size 





 
pqk
pqkccc
s 

2
893
1
22
*
 
% 
4. sustainable harvest effort 
   



 spqk
c
sq
rE s
1
1
12  
worker boat hour (mbh) 
Output values/ Management objectives:   
Objective name: Symbol Unit: 
1.sustainable periodic harvest profit 
 
2
1
1
4 



 spqk
crpks
 
AUD$ million 
2.total expected fish stock value      sVE
s
s


1  
E(Vs)* is the maximum E(Vs) achieved at s*  
AUD$ million 
3. sustainable harvest output 
  










2
1
1
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mmt 
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4. sustainable stock size 
 



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ckX s
1
1
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t* is the t that reaches E(Vs)*  
harvest periods t 
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7.prob. achieving 50% E(Vs)*         ss sss VEVEP







1
* *%50%50
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8.prob. achieving 75% E(Vs)*         ss sss VEVEP







1
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9.prob. achieving 100% E(Vs)*           ss sss VEtPVEP

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10.prob. achieving 125% E(Vs)*         ss sss VEVEP







1
* *%125%125
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11.prob. achieving 150% E(Vs)*         ss sss VEVEP







1
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The model input parameters include the intrinsic growth rate r, per kg price p, stock carrying capacity k, per 
worker-boat-hour harvest cost c and the fleet’s catchability coefficient q. These are all parameters in the original 
Schaefer model (1954). The market discount rate ρ and the Poisson stock discount rate λ are from Li’s model. The 
first control variable is the marine reserve size s that is set by the regulators. There is a feasibility requirement on 
the s so that the model is implementable. That is, s must produce sensible (non-negative and finite) solutions for 
harvest output, effort and profit. The second control variable is harvest effort E, although its level is always set to 
maximize total harvest profit and the fishery's economic value. This is because fishers will fully exploit the 
regulations once they are laid down, whether the regulations are on quota, fishing area, limited season or gear used. 
In this paper we assume no irregular or illegal activities such as poaching. Consequently, s and E as control 
variables for targeting management objectives.  
The model outputs represent various management objectives. Traditionally, they include the sustainable periodic 
harvest profit, harvest output, and the sustainable stock size. In this paper, I add the total expected stock value; the 
expected time (number of harvest periods) and the probability of achieving the total expected stock value; and the 
respective probabilities of achieving 50%, 75%, 100%, 125% or 150% of total expected stock value. 
3. Simulation Results and Discussions 
3.1 Simulating Maximum Stock Value by Comparative Statics 
Simulation results of 8 different scenarios for a stylized fishery are summarized in Table 2. The 8 scenarios 
include the base scenario and 7 other scenarios. In each scenario exactly one parameter has a different value 
from the base scenario. In economic analysis, the technique is known as comparative statics. It measures the 
change in optimum values of the objective function and of the control variables when exactly one parameter of 
the model experiences a change. In the base scenario, the stock intrinsic growth rate r is 1% p.a., per kg fish 
price p is AUD$10 ($10 Australian dollars), the stock carrying capacity k is 1 million metric tons (or 1 mmt), the 
harvesting cost c is AUD$50 per worker per boat per hour (including all food, fuel, bait and tackle, equipment 
hire, service and maintenance), the fleet’s harvesting productivity (the catchability coefficient q) is 1×10-7mmt 
per worker boat hour per mmt biomass. This implies that, for example, given a biomass k of 1 mmt, for each 
vessel or boat that operates for one hour, a crew of 10 fishermen can catch 1×10-6mmt or 1 metric tonne of fish. 
Finally, the financial-markets discount rate ρ is 5% p.a. and the natural rate of stock collapse λ (without a marine 
reserve) is 0.02 (i.e., every year the stock has a probability of 0.02 of collapsing). The reserve size s is defined as 
the percentage of biomass not subject to exploitation. This is equivalent to s being the percentage of marine 
waters fenced off under the homogeneous stock distribution assumption. Any feasible or workable reserve size 
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must be under 95% (1-c/pqk) and the calculated optimal reserve size s* (that maximizes the total expected stock 
value) is 41.94%. This will achieve a seasonal harvest profit Πs of AUD$20.88 million (out of a sustained 
harvest output Hs of 0.002481 mmt and utilizing harvesting effort Es of 78,702 worker-boat-hours each season). 
The superscripts * and s imply the optimal and the sustainable, respectively. The maximum total expected stock 
value is E(Vs)* (the maximum E(Vs) value) = AUD$338.89 million. Following this harvesting program, an 
expected 33.377 harvest seasons (t*) will pass before E(Vs)* is realized, with a probability of success, P(E(Vs)*), of 
0.679. The probabilities of achieving 50% and 75% of E(Vs)*, i.e., P(0.5E(Vs)*) and P(0.75E(Vs)*), are 0.886 and 
0.804 respectively. It is not possible to achieve 125% and 150% of E(Vs)* (P(1.25E(Vs)*) = P(1.5E(Vs)*) = 0). 
Finally, the resulting sustained biomass X2s is 0.543 mmt (the lower sustained biomass X1s = 0.457 mmt will not be 
pursued by managers). 
 
Table 2. Comparative statics on maximum total expected fish stock value 
 Base scenario Scenario 2 Scenario 3 Scenario 4 Scenario 5 Scenario 6 Scenario 7 Scenario 8 
Management objectives: Output values: p = $15/kg k = 2 mmt 
q = 3×10-7mmt
/mbh/mmt 
biomass r = 5% p.a. c = $100/mbh ρ= 10% p.a. λ = 0.1 
1-c/pqk 95.00% 96.67% 97.50% 98.33% 95.00% 90.00% 95.00% 95.00% 
s* 41.94% 53.87% 60.70% 68.52% 41.94% 12.72% 21.39% 68.92% 
Πs $20.879 $32.276 $43.842 $22.423 $104.397 $19.600 $21.921 $17.604 
E(Vs)* $338.887 $544.969 $757.708 $398.303 $1,694.436 $290.552 $189.427 $217.110 
Hs 0.002481 0.002487 0.004980 0.002493 0.012407 0.002467 0.002490 0.002435 
Es 78,702 100,557 119,123 50,147 393,512 50,721 59,561 134,977 
X1s 0.457 0.464 0.936 0.474 0.457 0.443 0.468 0.420 
X2s 0.543 0.536 1.064 0.526 0.543 0.557 0.532 0.580 
t*  33.377 37.187 39.923 43.817 33.377 27.035 19.962 19.175 
P(t*) 0.679 0.710 0.731 0.759 0.679 0.624 0.731 0.551 
P(0.5E(Vs)*) 0.886 0.904 0.915 0.929 0.886 0.851 0.915 0.795 
P(0.75E(Vs)*) 0.804 0.831 0.849 0.871 0.804 0.753 0.849 0.680 
P(E(Vs)*) 0.679 0.710 0.731 0.759 0.679 0.624 0.731 0.551 
P(1.25E(Vs)*) n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 0.402 n/a 0.400 
P(1.5E(Vs)*) n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 0.200 
 
In scenario 2, p is raised to AUD$15 per kg (keeping all other input parameters unchanged). The harvesting fleet 
still aims to maximize periodic harvest profit and total expected stock value by trading off this maximum periodic 
profit with the risk of sudden stock collapse. Compared to the base scenario, s* is increased to 53.87% but still 
within the feasible limit of 96.67%. This will achieve a higher Πs of AUD$32.28 million (out of a higher Hs of 
0.002487 mmt and utilizing higher Es of 100,557 worker-boat-hours each season). E(Vs)*is higher as 
AUD$544.97 million. In this scenario, more seasons (t* = 37.19) are required to achieve E(Vs)* but the 
probability of success is also higher (0.710). The probabilities of achieving 50% and 75% of E(Vs)* are also 
higher at 0.904 and 0.831 respectively, compared to those in the based scenario. However, X2s is lower at 0.536 
mmt despite (or indeed because of) the more alluring market price. Again it is impossible to achieve 125% or 
150% of E(Vs).  
In scenario 3, k is raised to 2 mmt. s* is increased to 60.70% but within the new feasibility limit of 97.50%. This 
will achieve a higher Πs of AUD$43.84 million (out of a higher Hs of 0.00498 mmt and utilizing higher Es of 
119,123 worker-boat-hours each season). E(Vs)* is higher at AUD$757.71 million. Still more seasons (t* = 39.92) 
are required to achieve E(Vs)* but the probability of success is also increased to 0.731. The probabilities of 
achieving 50% and 75% of E(Vs)* are also correspondingly higher at 0.915 and 0.849 respectively. With a higher 
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biomass k to start with, the resulting sustainable stock size of X2s is also higher at 1.0636 mmt. 
In scenario 4, q is raised to 3×10-7. All other input parameters remain unchanged from the base scenario, to 
which all comparisons are again made. s* is increased to 68.52% and is within the now more tolerable feasibility 
limit of 98.33%. This will achieve a higher Πs of AUD$22.42 million (out of a higher Hs of 0.00249 mmt and 
utilizing lower Es of 50,147.31 worker-boat-hours each season). Again, E(Vs)* is higher at AUD$398.30 million. 
The probability of success at achieving E(Vs)* is higher at 0.759. On the other hand, more seasons (t* = 43.82) are 
also required to achieve this. Correspondingly, the probabilities of successfully achieving 50% and 75% of E(Vs)* 
are higher at 0.929 and 0.871 respectively. With a higher catch efficiency, the sustainably harvested stock size of 
X2s is not surprisingly lower at 0.526 mmt. 
In the 5th scenario, the stock growth rate r is increased to 5%. The optimal reserve size s* stays at 41.94% and 
within the same feasibility limit of 95%. This will achieve a significantly higher seasonal harvest profit Πs of 
AUD$104.40 million (out of a much higher Hs of 0.01241 mmt and utilizing an equally impressive higher Es of 
393,511.52 worker-boat-hours each season). The total expected stock value E(Vs)* has increased to 
AUD$1,694.44 million. This suggests that a higher stock growth rate brings in substantially more economic 
benefits than a rise in market price, biomass or catch efficiency. What’s more, all relevant probabilities of success, 
number of seasons required and the sustainably harvested stock size are steady. 
In the 6th scenario, c is more costly at AUD$100 per worker per boat per hour. s* is dramatically lowered to 
12.72% but still within the now lower feasibility limit of 90%. Πs, Hs, Es, E(Vs)* also dropped significantly to 
AUD$19.60 million, 0.002467 mmt, 50,721.21 worker-boat-hours, and AUD$290.55 million respectively. This 
suggests a higher harvesting cost (perhaps due to shortage of skilled fishermen, higher wages and/or expensive 
capital equipment) could be devastating to the fishing community. The probabilities of successfully achieving 
E(Vs)* or 50%, 75% or 125% of it are also lower to 0.624, 0.851, 0.753 and 0.402 respectively. The only bright 
spot is that fewer seasons (t* = 27.04) are required to achieve E(Vs)* and the sustained stock size X2sis higher at 
0.557 mmt. 
In the 7th scenario, ρ is raised to 10% p.a. (perhaps during a recession). The effect of raising interest rate (or 
discount rate) is to slow down the economy, reducing investment, employment and consumption. The reason for 
the economy slowing down is that future earnings are discounted more (meaning less valuable compared to current 
earnings). Current borrowing costs are also higher and these ultimately reduce economic activity, including fishery. 
To make up for the lower future harvest profits, the stock is harvested more intensively. This leads to a lower 
optimal reserve size s* at 21.39% (within the same feasible boundary of 95%). As a result of the more intensive use 
of the resource, Πsand Hs are higher at AUD$21.92 million and 0.00249 mmt respectively. However, harvest effort 
Es is lower at 59,561.42 worker-boat-hours each season, reflecting a slowing economy. High interest rates eat into 
the total expected stock value E(Vs)*, which dropped to AUD$189.43 million. The lower E(Vs)* requires fewer 
seasons (t* = 19.96) to achieve. The probabilities of success at achieving 50%, 75% and 100% of E(Vs)* are 
respectively higher at 0.915, 0.849 and 0.731. Not surprisingly, the more intensive use of the stock lowered the 
sustainably harvested stock size X2s to 0.532 mmt. 
In the last scenario 8, λ is raised to 0.1. This means catastrophic stock collapse (making all future harvests 
non-profitable) is now five times more likely than the base scenario. It is not surprising that a marine reserve is 
now more appealing as an insurance against stock collapse and s* is increased to 68.92% (within the same 
feasibility limit of 95%). A higher reserve size eats into the harvest profit Πs and output Hs, which are both lower at 
AUD$17.60 million and 0.00244 mmt respectively. As a result, fishermen need to work harder at a higher Es of 
134,976.96 worker-boat-hours each season. The result is a lower E(Vs)* of AUD$217.11 million. They now 
require only t* = 19.18 seasons to achieve but with a lower probability of success at 0.551. The probabilities of 
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success at achieving 50%, 75%, 125% and 150% of E(Vs)* are all lower at 0.795, 0.680, 0.440 and 0.200 
respectively. The latter two are only possible (probability > 0) with a lower E(Vs) to begin with. Stronger protection 
measure (higher s*) means that X2s is also now higher at 0.580 mmt, vis-à-vis the base scenario. 
3.2 Simulating Competing Management Objectives 
In the next set of simulations, the previous eight scenarios are retained. However, I do not maximize the total 
expected stock value by selecting the optimal marine reserve size and harvest effort. Instead, I simulate the output 
values of competing management objectives by running the reserve size over its entire feasible range in each 
scenario (Tables 3 to 10). Unlike the reserve size, harvest effort cannot be manipulated in this manner. This is 
because fishers always fully exploit the regulatory environment. Therefore any less-than-optimal harvest effort 
will not be realistic. 
 
Table 3. Simulating competing management objectives for base scenario 
Management 
objectives/ 
Reserve size 
0.00% 10.00% 20.00% 30.00% 40.00% 50.00% 60.00% 70.00% 80.00% 90.00% 95.00% 
Πs $22.563  $22.299  $21.973  $21.556 $21.007 $20.250 $19.141 $17.361 $14.063  $6.250  $0.000 
E(Vs)* $322.321 $327.932  $332.919  $336.814 $338.822 $337.500 $330.011 $310.020 $260.417  $120.192  $0.000 
Hs 0.002494 0.002492 0.002490 0.002487 0.002483 0.002475 0.002461 0.002431 0.002344 0.001875 0.000000
Es 47,500  52,469  58,594  66,327  76,389  90,000  109,375 138,889 187,500  250,000  0  
X1s 0.475  0.472  0.469  0.464  0.458  0.450  0.438  0.417  0.375  0.250  0.000  
X2s 0.525  0.528  0.531  0.536  0.542  0.550  0.563  0.583  0.625  0.750  1.000  
t 25.055 26.583 28.341 30.397 32.845 35.835 39.620 44.672 52.054 65.162 78.637 
P(t) 0.606 0.620 0.635 0.653 0.674 0.699 0.728 0.765 0.812 0.878 0.924 
P(0.5E(Vs)*) 0.828 0.842 0.856 0.870 0.883 0.897 0.911 0.923 0.929 n/a n/a 
P(0.75E(Vs)*) 0.718 0.738 0.759 0.779 0.800 0.821 0.840 0.854 0.829 n/a n/a 
P(E(Vs)*) 0.573 0.598 0.624 0.649 0.674 0.696 0.707 0.639 n/a n/a n/a 
P(1.25E(Vs)*) 0.327 0.341 0.345 0.322 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
P(1.5E(Vs)*) n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
 
Table 4. Simulating competing management objectives for scenario 2 
Management 
objectives/ 
Reserve size 
0.00% 10.00% 20.00% 30.00% 40.00% 50.00% 60.00% 70.00% 80.00% 90.00% 96.67% 
Πs $35.042  $34.774  $34.440  $34.014 $33.449 $32.667 $31.510 $29.630 $26.042  $16.667  $0.000 
E(Vs)* $500.595 $511.377  $521.820  $531.463 $539.501 $544.444 $543.283 $529.101 $482.253  $320.513  $0.000 
Hs 0.002497 0.002497 0.002496 0.002494 0.002492 0.002489 0.002483 0.002469 0.002431 0.002222 0.000000
Es 48,333  53,498  59,896  68,027  78,704  93,333  114,583 148,148 208,333  333,333  (0) 
X1s 0.483  0.481  0.479  0.476  0.472  0.467  0.458  0.444  0.417  0.333  (0.000) 
X2s 0.517  0.519  0.521  0.524  0.528  0.533  0.542  0.556  0.583  0.667  1.000  
T 25.055 26.583 28.341 30.397 32.845 35.835 39.620 44.672 52.054 65.162 86.615 
P(t) 0.606 0.620 0.635 0.653 0.674 0.699 0.728 0.765 0.812 0.878 0.944 
P(0.5E(Vs)*) 0.821 0.836 0.851 0.867 0.882 0.898 0.913 0.929 0.942 0.934 n/a 
P(0.75E(Vs)*) 0.705 0.727 0.750 0.773 0.797 0.822 0.846 0.869 0.884 n/a n/a 
P(E(Vs)*) 0.548 0.576 0.606 0.636 0.667 0.698 0.726 0.739 n/a n/a n/a 
P(1.25E(Vs)*) 0.239 0.247 0.236 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
P(1.5E(Vs)*) n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
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Table 5. Simulating competing management objectives for scenario 3 
Management 
objectives/ 
Reserve size 
0.00% 10.00% 20.00% 30.00% 40.00% 50.00% 60.00% 70.00% 80.00% 90.00% 97.50% 
Πs $47.531  $47.261  $46.924  $46.492 $45.920 $45.125 $43.945 $42.014 $38.281  $28.125  $0.000 
E(Vs)* $679.018   $695.012  $710.967  $726.443 $740.647 $752.083 $757.678 $750.248 $708.912  $540.865  $0.000 
Hs 0.004997 0.004996 0.004995 0.004994 0.004991 0.004988 0.004980 0.004965 0.004922 0.004688 0.000000
Es 48,750  54,012  60,547  68,878  79,861  95,000  117,188 152,778 218,750  375,000  0  
X1s 0.975  0.972  0.969  0.964  0.958  0.950  0.938  0.917  0.875  0.750  0.000  
X2s 1.025  1.028  1.031  1.036  1.042  1.050  1.063  1.083  1.125  1.250  2.000  
T 25.055 26.583 28.341 30.397 32.845 35.835 39.620 44.672 52.054 65.162 92.302 
P(t) 0.606 0.620 0.635 0.653 0.674 0.699 0.728 0.765 0.812 0.878 0.955 
P(0.5E(Vs)*) 0.816 0.832 0.848 0.864 0.880 0.897 0.914 0.931 0.947 0.956 n/a 
P(0.75E(Vs)*) 0.695 0.718 0.743 0.768 0.793 0.820 0.847 0.873 0.897 n/a n/a 
P(E(Vs)*) 0.528 0.559 0.590 0.624 0.658 0.694 0.728 0.757 0.694 n/a n/a 
P(1.25E(Vs)*) 0.106 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
P(1.5E(Vs)*) n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
 
Table 6. Simulating competing management objectives for scenario 4 
Management 
objectives/ 
Reserve size 
0.00% 10.00% 20.00% 30.00% 40.00% 50.00% 60.00% 70.00% 80.00% 90.00% 98.33% 
Πs $24.174  $24.083  $23.969  $23.824 $23.630 $23.361 $22.960 $22.299 $21.007  $17.361  $0.000 
E(Vs)* $345.337 $354.157  $363.169  $372.245 $381.136 $389.352 $395.863 $398.203 $389.017  $333.868  $0.000 
Hs 0.002499 0.002499 0.002499 0.002499 0.002498 0.002497 0.002496 0.002492 0.002483 0.002431 0.000000
Es 16,389  18,176  20,399  23,243  27,006  32,222  39,931  52,469  76,389  138,889  0  
X1s 0.492  0.491  0.490  0.488  0.486  0.483  0.479  0.472  0.458  0.417  0.000  
X2s 0.508  0.509  0.510  0.512  0.514  0.517  0.521  0.528  0.542  0.583  1.000  
t  25.055 26.583 28.341 30.397 32.845 35.835 39.620 44.672 52.054 65.162 100.346
P(t) 0.606 0.620 0.635 0.653 0.674 0.699 0.728 0.765 0.812 0.878 0.967 
P(0.5E(Vs)*) 0.809 0.825 0.842 0.859 0.877 0.895 0.913 0.931 0.950 0.966 n/a 
P(0.75E(Vs)*) 0.681 0.706 0.732 0.759 0.787 0.815 0.845 0.875 0.905 0.924 n/a 
P(E(Vs)*) 0.499 0.532 0.566 0.603 0.641 0.682 0.724 0.765 0.789 n/a n/a 
P(1.25E(Vs)*) n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
P(1.5E(Vs)*) n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
 
Table 7. Simulating competing management objectives for scenario 5 
Management 
objectives/ 
Reserve size 
0.00% 10.00% 20.00% 30.00% 40.00% 50.00% 60.00% 70.00% 80.00% 90.00% 95.00% 
Πs $112.813  $111.497  $109.863  $107.781 $105.035 $101.250 $95.703  $86.806  $70.313  $31.250  $0.000 
E(Vs)* $1,611.607  $1,639.660  $1,664.595  $1,684.072 $1,694.108 $1,687.500 $1,650.054 $1,550.099 $1,302.083  $600.962  $0.000 
Hs 0.012469 0.012461 0.012451 0.012436 0.012413 0.012375 0.012305 0.012153 0.011719 0.009375 0.000000
Es 237,500  262,346  292,969  331,633  381,944  450,000  546,875  694,444  937,500  1,250,000  0  
X1s 0.475  0.472  0.469  0.464  0.458  0.450  0.438  0.417  0.375  0.250  0.000  
X2s 0.525  0.528  0.531  0.536  0.542  0.550  0.563  0.583  0.625  0.750  1.000  
t 25.055 26.583 28.341 30.397 32.845 35.835 39.620 44.672 52.054 65.162 78.637 
P(t) 0.606 0.620 0.635 0.653 0.674 0.699 0.728 0.765 0.812 0.878 0.924 
P(0.5E(Vs)*) 0.828 0.842 0.856 0.870 0.883 0.897 0.911 0.923 0.929 n/a n/a 
P(0.75E(Vs)*) 0.718 0.738 0.759 0.779 0.800 0.821 0.840 0.854 0.829 n/a n/a 
P(E(Vs)*) 0.573 0.598 0.624 0.649 0.674 0.696 0.707 0.639 n/a n/a n/a 
P(1.25E(Vs)*) 0.327 0.341 0.345 0.322 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
P(1.5E(Vs)*) n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
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Table 8. Simulating competing management objectives for scenario 6 
Management 
objectives/ 
Reserve size 
0.00% 10.00% 20.00% 30.00% 40.00% 50.00% 60.00% 70.00% 80.00% 90.00% 
Πs $20.250  $19.753  $19.141 $18.367 $17.361 $16.000 $14.063 $11.111 $6.250  $0.000  
E(Vs)* $289.286  $290.487  $290.009 $286.990 $280.018 $266.667 $242.457 $198.413 $115.741  $0.000  
Hs 0.002475 0.002469 0.002461 0.002449 0.002431 0.002400 0.002344 0.002222 0.001875 0.000000 
Es 45,000  49,383  54,688  61,224  69,444  80,000  93,750  111,111 125,000  0  
X1s 0.450  0.444  0.438  0.429  0.417  0.400  0.375  0.333  0.250  0.000  
X2s 0.550  0.556  0.563  0.571  0.583  0.600  0.625  0.667  0.750  1.000  
t  25.055 26.583 28.341 30.397 32.845 35.835 39.620 44.672 52.054 65.162 
P(t) 0.606 0.620 0.635 0.653 0.674 0.699 0.728 0.765 0.812 0.878 
P(0.5E(Vs)*) 0.837 0.848 0.858 0.869 0.878 0.886 0.890 0.880 n/a n/a 
P(0.75E(Vs)*) 0.734 0.749 0.764 0.777 0.789 0.796 0.788 0.623 n/a n/a 
P(E(Vs)*) 0.603 0.620 0.634 0.645 0.647 0.621 n/a n/a n/a n/a 
P(1.25E(Vs)*) 0.403 0.404 0.386 0.285 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
P(1.5E(Vs)*) n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
 
Table 9. Simulating competing management objectives for scenario 7 
Management 
objectives/ 
Reserve size 
0.00% 10.00% 20.00% 30.00% 40.00% 50.00% 60.00% 70.00% 80.00% 90.00% 95.00% 
Πs $22.563  $22.299  $21.973  $21.556 $21.007 $20.250 $19.141 $17.361 $14.063  $6.250  $0.000 
E(Vs)* $188.021 $188.978  $189.419  $189.089 $187.562 $184.091 $177.228 $163.784 $135.216  $61.275  $0.000 
Hs 0.002494 0.002492 0.002490 0.002487 0.002483 0.002475 0.002461 0.002431 0.002344 0.001875 0.000000
Es 47,500  52,469  58,594  66,327  76,389  90,000  109,375 138,889 187,500  250,000  0  
X1s 0.475  0.472  0.469  0.464  0.458  0.450  0.438  0.417  0.375  0.250  0.000  
X2s 0.525  0.528  0.531  0.536  0.542  0.550  0.563  0.583  0.625  0.750  1.000  
t 17.918 18.803 19.810 20.971 22.336 23.979 26.027 28.717 32.581 39.318 46.151 
P(t) 0.699 0.713 0.728 0.746 0.765 0.787 0.812 0.842 0.878 0.924 0.955 
P(0.5E(Vs)*) 0.897 0.905 0.914 0.922 0.931 0.939 0.947 0.954 0.956 n/a n/a 
P(0.75E(Vs)*) 0.820 0.833 0.847 0.860 0.873 0.886 0.897 0.903 n/a n/a n/a 
P(E(Vs)*) 0.694 0.711 0.728 0.744 0.757 0.760 0.694 n/a n/a n/a n/a 
P(1.25E(Vs)*) n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
P(1.5E(Vs)*) n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
 
Table 10. Simulating competing management objectives for scenario 8 
Management 
objectives/ 
Reserve size 
0.00% 10.00% 20.00% 30.00% 40.00% 50.00% 60.00% 70.00% 80.00% 90.00% 95.00% 
Πs $22.563  $22.299  $21.973  $21.556 $21.007 $20.250 $19.141 $17.361 $14.063  $6.250  $0.000 
E(Vs)* $150.417 $159.281  $169.020  $179.634 $190.972 $202.500 $212.674 $217.014 $200.893  $104.167  $0.000 
Hs 0.002494 0.002492 0.002490 0.002487 0.002483 0.002475 0.002461 0.002431 0.002344 0.001875 0.000000
Es 47,500  52,469  58,594  66,327  76,389  90,000  109,375 138,889 187,500  250,000  0  
X1s 0.475  0.472  0.469  0.464  0.458  0.450  0.438  0.417  0.375  0.250  0.000  
X2s 0.525  0.528  0.531  0.536  0.542  0.550  0.563  0.583  0.625  0.750  1.000  
t 8.109 8.837 9.710 10.780 12.123 13.863 16.219 19.617 25.055 35.835 47.958 
P(t) 0.444 0.451 0.460 0.470 0.483 0.500 0.523 0.555 0.606 0.699 0.787 
P(0.5E(Vs)*) 0.577 0.605 0.635 0.666 0.699 0.732 0.766 0.799 0.823 0.667 n/a 
P(0.75E(Vs)*) 0.409 0.441 0.477 0.515 0.555 0.598 0.642 0.684 0.708 n/a n/a 
P(E(Vs)*) 0.269 0.301 0.336 0.375 0.418 0.464 0.512 0.555 0.554 n/a n/a 
P(1.25E(Vs)*) 0.159 0.185 0.215 0.249 0.288 0.330 0.373 0.401 0.262 n/a n/a 
P(1.5E(Vs)*) 0.077 0.095 0.115 0.139 0.167 0.196 0.218 0.189 n/a n/a n/a 
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The feasible limit (the last column of each table) for the reserve size is the largest acceptable percentage of the 
biomass (or surface area of the fishing ground if the stock is sufficiently mobile) beyond which seasonal harvest 
output, effort and profit will become negative. In all eight scenarios, the smaller the reserve size s (going from 
right to left along the tables), the higher the seasonal profit Πs and seasonal output Hs. On the contrary, the 
following are lower: seasonal effort Es; sustainably harvested stock size X2s; number of seasons required (t, not t*) 
to achieved the expected total stock value E(Vs) (not the maximum E(Vs)* achievable at the optimal s*); and the 
probabilities of success at achieving the total expected stock value or any portion of it. In other words, under any 
regulatory environment (represented here by s), profit (Πs) and output (Hs) are in conflict with and must be 
traded off for job provision and long-term employment security (Es and t), stock conservation (X2s) and less risky 
harvesting (P(E(Vs)). More importantly, the trade-off is not a nuclear option (all or nothing). It can be done 
incrementally and evaluated quantitatively. 
The probabilities of success at achieving 50%, 75%, 100%, 125% and 150% of the maximum total expected stock 
value E(Vs)* (not the E(Vs) under each simulated s) appear to drop a little after reaching their maximum before 
becoming impossible to achieve (beyond the feasibility limit for s). The reason is that as the reserve size increases 
and reaches its feasibility limit (1-c/pqk), the seasonal harvest effort, output and profit and the total expected stock 
value drop abruptly. The rate of decline is much steeper than the rate of increase when the reserve size rises from 
zero. This decline in E(Vs) is sufficiently large to overcome the reduction in the risk of stock collapse at high s, 
causing the probability of success at achieving E(Vs) to drop slightly. Notice that the probability of achieving the 
maximum total expected stock value E(Vs)* at the optimal (most efficient) reserve size s* is P(E(Vs)*) or P(t*). It is 
not the same as the probability of achieving the total expected stock value E(Vs) at any other reserve size s, i.e., 
P(E(Vs)) or P(t). The reason is that the most efficient seasonal output, effort and profit under the 
optimum-harvesting regime are different for different reserve size. This will lead to a different total expected stock 
value, i.e., all discounted future harvest profits calculated at present. 
Finally, at the reserve size’s feasibility limit, all seasonal harvest effort, output and profit go to zero so there will be 
no total expected stock value to speak of. The probability of success becomes meaningless. Without harvesting, the 
biomass reaches its biological maximum carrying capacity (X2s). Notice that X1s and X2s are both achievable and 
sustainable levels of the biomass. Since X2s>X1s, managers will always strive to achieve X2s. 
4. Policy Implications 
Modern fisheries management should be objective-oriented and follow a partnership approach. Any committee of 
fishers, managers and community members must not see their differing and competing objectives as conflicting 
goals that can only be either one or the other (mutually exclusive). Instead, their desires or agendas must be laid 
bare to all concerned and subject to benign negotiations and agreeable trade-offs. Furthermore, the trade-offs 
should be done gradually (i.e., no objectives should be 0% or 100% satisfied) and be quantitatively transparent. 
In this paper, I adopted a multi-period, marine-reserve-adjusted, and random-stock-collapse-prone modification of 
the original Schaefer model (Li, 2000). I then ran simulations on various common management objectives. The 
simulations were run on the principle of optimum harvesting (i.e., restricted entry and profit maximization). This 
uses the reserve size and fishing effort to balance the return (total derivable stock value) against risks (of random 
stock collapse and uncertainty in total derivable stock value). 
The simulation results are two-fold. First, by maximizing total stock value, changes in the model parameters can 
drastically affect the outcomes of the common objectives. For example, a higher stock growth rate brings in 
substantially more economic benefits than a rise in market price, biomass or catch efficiency; whereas a higher 
harvesting cost could be devastating to the fishing community. Rising interest rates force the harvest fleet to work 
harder by both cutting harvest effort and fishing more intensively into the stock. Higher collapse risks bring about 
the exact opposite. 
Second, by altering the regulatory environment (represented by the reserve size), I have shown that profit and 
output are in conflict with and must be traded off the following: job provision and long-term employment security, 
stock conservation and less risky harvesting. More importantly, the trade-off can be achieved gradually and 
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incrementally. It is not merely either one or the other. It can also be quantitatively evaluated. An economically 
viable harvest return must balance against the risk of stock collapse and harvest uncertainty. 
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